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I.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Jurisdiction.

The

Utah

Supreme

Court

had

original,

non-exclusive jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.

§ 78-2-2(3)(i)

(Supp.

1988)

inasmuch

as

the Order

and

Judgment which are the subjects of this appeal (Record on Appeal
(MR.M) at 105-6; 233-34), copies of which are attached hereto as
Addenda MA" and "B," respectively/ are final orders of the Second
Judicial District Court of Weber County, over which the Utah
Court of Appeals did not have original appellate jurisdiction.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)(g) (Supp. 1988), however,
the Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court
of Appeals on June 15, 1988.
Nature of Proceeding.

(R. 380.)

This is an appeal by appellants David

Durbano, Paul Sachter and Richard Mortensen from an Order and a
Judgment of the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County.
The Order was entered by the Honorable David E. Roth and denied
the appellants Motion to Dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)
of
ff

the Utah

A.lf)

Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 105-6; Addendum

The Judgment was entered by the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde

in favor of respondents in response to their Motion for Summary
Judgment

brought

Procedure.

pursuant

to

Rule

(R. 233-34; Addendum "B.")
-1-

56, Utah

Rules

of

Civil

II.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Whether The District Court Properly Denied
Appellants1 Motion To Dismiss By Ruling That
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) Was Inapplicable To Junior Lienholders Seeking A Money
Judgment After A Foreclosure Sale By A Senior
Lienholder.

B.

Whether The District Court Properly Granted
Respondents1 Motion For Summary Judgment By
Ruling That There Were No Genuine Issues Of
Material Fact And That Respondents Were
Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law.
III.
RELEVANT TEXT OF APPLICABLE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953).
Sale of Trust Property By Trustee; Action To Recover
Balance Due Upon Obligation For Which Trust Deed Was
Given As Security; Collection of Costs and Attorney's
Fees.
At any time within three months after any
sale of property under a trust deedf as
hereinabove
provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon the
obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security, and in such action the complaint
shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust
deed, the amount for which such property was
sold, and the fair market value thereof at the
date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the
court shall find the fair market value at the
date of sale of the property sold. The court
may not render judgment for more than the
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale,
including
trustee's and attorney's fees,
-2-

exceeds the fair market value of the property
as of the date of the sale.
In any action
brought under this sectionf the prevailing
party shall be entitled to collect its costs
and reasonable attorney fees incurred in
bringing an action under this section,
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606 (1953).
Impairment of recourse or of collateral.
(1) The holder discharges any party to
the instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of
rights releases or agrees not to sue any
person against whom the party has to the
knowledge of the holder a right of recourse or
agrees to suspend the right to enforce against
such person the instrument or collateral or
otherwise discharges such person/ except that
failure or delay in effecting any required
presentment, protest or notice of dishonor
with respect to any such person does not
discharge any party as to whom presentment,
protest or notice of dishonor is effective or
unnecessary; or
(b) unjustifiably
impairs
any
collateral for the instrument given by or on
behalf of the party or any person against whom
he has a right of recourse.
(2) By
express
reservation
rights
against a party with a right of recourse the
holder preserves
(a) all his rights against such
party as of the time when the instrument was
originally due; and
(b) the right of the party to pay
the instrument as of that time; and

-3-

(c) all rights
recourse against others.

of

such party

to

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of

the Case.

This action was commenced by the

plaintiffs/respondents to recover on a promissory note executed
by the defendants/appellants, as well as by defendants Steven R.
Cundick
appeal.

and Marlene H. Cundick, who are not parties

to this

(R. 1-8.)

Course of Proceeding and Disposition in the Court Below.
Defendants/appellants

moved

to

dismiss

the

Complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the
grounds

that

plaintiffs/respondents

had

not

commenced

their

action within the three-month period set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-32 (1953).
and argument
David E.

(R. 24-26.)

of counsel,

Roth

After considering the memoranda

the district

presiding,

denied

court, the Honorable
the

motion

of

defendants/appellants, ruling that the statute was inapplicable
to

the

facts

of

this

case.

(R. 105-6;

Addendum

fl

Thereafter, and again after considering memoranda, argument,

1

A.M)
and

Defendants/respondents did not designate a transcript of
the hearing on the Motion as part of the record on appeal, nor
did they order that a transcript be prepared.

-4-

affidavits submitted by the parties, the district court, the
Honorable

Ronald 0.

Hyde

presiding,

granted

the

Motion

for

Summary Judgment of plaintiffs/respondents on the grounds that
there

were

no

respondents

genuine

were

issues

entitled

to

of

material

judgment

fact

as

a matter

to

December

and

that

of

law.

(R. 233-34; Addendum "B.")
Statement

of

the

Facts.

Prior

of

1979,

plaintiffs/respondents G. Adams Limited Partnership ("Adams") and
C. A. Ferrin, Jr. ("Ferrin"), owned a parcel of property located
in

Ogden,

Utah,

"Property").

which

was

(R. 139.)

divided
On

into

three

December 14,

pieces

1979,

(the

defendants

/appellants David L. Durbano, Paul Sachter and Richard Mortensen
("Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen") entered into a contract to
purchase the Property from Adams and Ferrin for the price of
$165,000.00, $20,000.00 of which was paid as a down payment, with
the balance to be paid under the terms of a Uniform Real Estate
Contract.

(R. 140; 142.)

Certain payments were made under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract.

(R. 140 at

11 4.)

Beginning

in January of 1983,

however, Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen were in default.
at 1[ 4.)

(R. 14

They remained in default under the contract until May

of 1984 when they reached an agreement with Adams and Ferrin,
pursuant to which Adams and Ferrin allowed the Property to be

-5-

sold to defendants Steven R. Cundick and Marlene H. Cundick (the
"Cundick sale").

(R. 140 at 11 4.)

Pursuant to the agreementf

Adams and Ferrin were to receive the proceeds from the Cundick
sale, which, when and if fully paid, would satisfy the amount of
the obligation

which

remained

owing

by Durbano, Sachter

Mortensen under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

and

(R. 140 at

11 4.)
In

connection

with

the

Cundick

sale, Adams

and

Ferrin

demanded that Sachter, Mortensen and Durbano, as well as the
Cundicks, execute a promissory
covering the Property.
accurate
Addendum

copy
f,

C.M)

of

note secured by a trust deed

(R. 140 at 11 5; R. 47; R. 49; a true and

the promissory

note

is attached

hereto as

The amount of the promissory note was the amount

which remained owing by Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen under the
original Uniform Real Estate Contract, less the cash down payment
received by Adams and Ferrin from the Cundick sale.

(R. 140 at

1IK 4 and 5.)
In order to finance the cash down payment made to Adams and
Ferrin in connection with the Cundick sale, the Cundicks borrowed
a sum from Citizens Bank.

(R. 141 at 11 5.)

To reiterate, that

sum was applied to reduce the existing obligation of Durbano,
Sachter and Mortensen under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
(R. 141 at 11 5.)

In agreeing to finance the cash down payment,

-6-

howeverf Citizens Bank required that it receive a trust deed in a
first position on the Property; Adams and Ferrin, desiring to
facilitate
covering
11 5.)

the sale, agreed

to subordinate

their

the Property to that of Citizens Bank.

trust deed
(R. 141 at

Therefore, the trust deed given to Citizens Bank, which

was executed contemporaneously with the trust deed given to Adams
and Ferrin, (see R. 50 (Adams and Ferrin Trust Deed); R. 202;
(Citizens Bank Trust Deed)), was recorded in a first position,
and the trust deed of Adams and Ferrin was recorded in a second
position.
Subsequently,

the

Cundicks

obligations to Citizens Bank.

defaulted

on

(R. 141; R. 146.)

their

payment

Citizens Bank,

thereafter, became insolvent and was taken over by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation

("F.D.I .C.") .

(R. 141 at 11 6.)

The F.D.I.C. ultimately foreclosed the trust deed that had been
given to Citizens Bank and a trustee's sale was held on March 7,
1987, at which time the F.D.I.C. purchased the Property with a
credit-bid of $40,521.50.
Cundicks1
default

obligation
was

(R. 147 at K 4.)

to Citizens Bank

$37,302.06, plus

(R. 148), there

were

no

at

interest,

proceeds

As the amount of the

from

the time of their

penalties
the

and

trustee's

fees,
sale

available to pay Adams and Ferrin, and Adams and Ferrin received

-7-

nothing from the trustee's sale.

(R. 147 at 11 5; R. 141 at 11 6;

R. 48 at K 5.)
In the meantime, Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen, as well as
the Cundicks, failed to make any payments under the promissory
note

to Adams

or

Ferrin.

(R. 48 at

11 7.)

Significantly,

however, neither Adams nor Ferrin ever instituted a foreclosure
action, whether judicial or non-judicial, on their junior trust
deed.

(R. 48 at K 6.)

Instead, their security under their note

having been exhausted

by the F.D.I.C.fs trustee's sale, they

filed suit on August 19, 1987 against Durbano, Sachter, Mortensen
and the Cundicks, seeking a money judgment under the promissory
note.

(R. 1-4.)
In response, Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen moved to dismiss

the Complaint on the grounds that it was filed more than three
months after the F.D.I.C.'s trustee's sale held on March 7, 1987,
allegedly

in

(R. 24-26.)

violation

of

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 57-1-32

(1953).

Recognizing that it was the F.D.I.C, rather than

Adams and Ferrin which foreclosed its trust deed and caused the
trustee's sale to occur, Judge David E. Roth concluded that Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-32 was inapplicable and, therefore, denied the
Motion to Dismiss.

(R. 104.)

Thereafter, Adams and Ferrin moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that there were no genuine issues of material fact

-8-

and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(R. 80.)

The

motion

was

supported

by memoranda

(R. 53-57;

R. 128-37), and the affidavits of C. A. Ferrinf Jr. (R. 47-48;
149-50),

Glenn

(R. 146-48).

Adams

(R. 139-144),

and

Alfred J.

Newman

Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen responded with their

own memorandum and affidavits in which they argued that (1) they
signed the note as guarantors rather than as principal obligors
(R. 115), and (2) they did not receive anything of "value" in
return

for

Durbano,

signing

Sachter

and

the

note

Mortensen

(R. 115).
dated

(See Affidavits of

12/23/87

at

R. 118-20;

121-23; 124-126, respectively.)2
At the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge
Ronald Hyde granted Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen ten-days to
file additional documents which, at the hearing, their attorney

z

Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, respondents
discovered that the affidavit of David Durbano (R. 118-20) may
have been filed with a forged signature.
That possibility is
clearly illustrated by a comparison between Durbano1s signature
on the affidavit, with Durbano*s signature on other documents in
the record, such as the promissory note (R. 76; Addendum "C"),
and, most graphically, another affidavit which was ultimately
filed by appellants (R. 172-79), which affidavit was subsequently
stricken by the district court.
(See Ruling on Plaintiffs'
Motion to Strike Affidavits, R. 341-42; Addendum "D" hereto.)
Respondents moved the district court for leave, pursuant to Rule
27(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to take depositions during
the pendency of this appeal regarding the possible forgery. The
motion was granted and depositions were scheduled to occur at the
time this Brief was prepared.

-9-

contended

would

support

their

position

in opposition

to the

motion, but which documents were allegedly unavailable at the
time of

the

hearing.

(R. 211.)

After

the ten-day period

expired, appellants' attorney contacted Judge Hyde, ex parte, and
obtained an extension of time in which to file the documents.
(R. 217-18; R. 341-42.)

Thereafter, appellants' attorney filed

additional affidavits with the Court

(R. 172-79), as well as

numerous documents (R. 170-71; 184-205), all but a few of which
had

been

previously

appellants'

counsel

judgment hearing.

furnished
almost

by

eight

(R. 217-20.)

respondents1

months

counsel

before

the

to

summary

Adams and Ferrin promptly filed

a Motion to Strike the newly filed affidavits on the grounds they
were

filed

grounds

untimely

they

statements.

were

and without
replete

leave of court, and on the

with

(R. 222-23; R. 229-31.)

hearsay

and

conclusory

Contrary to appellants'

curious statement that "no Order has been signed" in regard to
the Motion to Strike (Appellants' Brief at p. 11), Judge Hyde
himself wrote a strongly worded ruling striking the affidavits on
the grounds that they were filed without leave of court, raised
new argument, and contained conclusory statements.

(R. 341-42; a

copy of the Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavits is
attached hereto as Addendum "D".)

-10-

Thereafter, Judge Hyde granted

the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Adams and Ferrin and
against all defendants.

(R. 233-34; Addendum

ff

B.")

V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) Is Inapplicable To Junior Lienholders Seeking A Money
Judgment After A Foreclosure Sale By A Senior
Lienholder.

Appellants contend that the district court erred in denying
their Motion to Dismiss respondents1 Complaint pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953).

Appellants' argument is completely

Appellants have failed to note that respondents1

without merit.

action is not an action for a deficiency governed by Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-32
promissory
Assuming

note
for

(1953); ratherf
to

which

argument

that

that

it is a suit on an unsecured
statute

the

has

respondents1

no

application.

action

can

be

properly characterized as an action for a deficiency/ courts have
nonetheless consistently held that statutes/ like Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-32 (1953)f have no application to junior lienholders like
respondents who have never exercised their power of sale and
whose note becomes unsecured as a result of a foreclosure by a
senior

lienholder.

The

rational

behind

those

decisions

is

compelling from a policy standpoint because (1) it protects the
rights of sold out junior lienholders who may be unaware their

-11-

security has been lost through foreclosure of a senior lien, and
(2) it protects debtors against the unexpected acceleration of
notes that are not in default and have not yet matured.

Thusf

the district court properly denied appellant's Motion to Dismiss.
B.

The
District
Court
Properly
Granted
Respondents' Motion For Summary Judgment In
That There Were No Genuine Issues Of Material
Fact And Respondents Were Entitled To Judgment
As A Matter Of Law.

In contending

that the district court erred in granting

respondents' Motion for Summary Judgmentf
following arguments:

First, they contend

appellants make the
that they were not

principally obligated under the notef but rather signed the note
(Appellants1

merely as "guarantors" or "accommodation makers."
Brief at pp. 38-42.)
obligations

under

As such, appellants contend that their

the

note

should

be

discharged

because

respondents unjustifiably impaired the collateral under the note
by subordinating

their

(Id.)

appellants

Second,

trust deed

to that of Citizens Bank.

contend

that

there

were

several

"material issues" of fact created by the affidavits submitted by
them which preclude the entry of summary judgment.

(_Id. at pp.

43-48.)
Both of the appellants' arguments, however, are completely
without

merit.

In

regard

to

the

impairment

of

collateral

argument, appellants presented not a shred of evidence, other
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than their
support

own self-serving

the

notion

"accommodation

they

and conclusory affidavits, which

signed

makers."

the note as

Indeed,

"guarantors" or

appellants

cannot

be

accommodation makers of the subject promissory note because the
note

represented

themselves.

the

antecedent

debt

of

the

appellants

Nonetheless, even if they enjoyed the status of

accommodation makers, they expressly waived their impairment of
collateral defense by consenting "to the release of any security,
or any part thereof, with or without substitution" under the
terms of the note.

(R. 49; Addendum "C")

Further, even if they

were guarantors and did not waive their impairment of collateral
defense, appellants presented no evidence that they did not know
about or
deed.

consent

to

respondents' subordination

of

the trust

Thus, there is no support for appellants1 contention that

they should somehow be discharged from their obligations because
of the subordination.
Additionally, appellants1 suggestion that issues of genuine
material fact existed before the district court which precluded
the entry of summary
record.

judgment is simply not born out by the

Appellants suggest that they did not receive value for

the note (Appellants' Brief, p. 38), that the amount owing under
the

note was

disputed

questions concerning

(^d.

at p. 43), and

that

there were

both the value of the Property and the
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"intentions"

of

the parties

(^d.

at

43; 46-48).

At best,

howeverf appellants' suggestions constitute wishful thinking.

At

worst, they are a blatant misrepresentation of the record.

In

either

event, as shown below, appellants' arguments

in this

regard cannot be supported.
VI.
ARGUMENT
A.

1.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) Is Inapplicable To Junior Lienholders Seeking A Money
Judgment After A Foreclosure Sale By A Senior
Lienholder.
Respondents' Complaint Is Based Solely On An Unsecured

Note and Is Not An Action For A Deficiency.

Appellants contend

that the district court erred in failing to dismiss respondents1
Complaint because it was not filed within the three-month time
limit required by Utah Code Ann. 57-1-32 (1953).
argument,

appellants

attempting

to corral

have
the

confines of that statute.

gone

to

In making their

extraordinary

lengths

facts of this case into the legal
That attempt, however, must fail; most

obviously because appellants have ignored entirely the nature of
respondents' action.

Put simply, respondents1 Complaint is not

an action for a deficiency governed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32
(1953); rather, it is a suit on an unsecured promissory note to
which the aforementioned statute has no application.
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It has long been recognized that a promissory note and a
deed of trust given to secure the payment of that promissory note
are separate and independent obligations.

See, e.g., Gebrueder

Heidemann, K.G. v. A.R.M. Corp., 688 P.2d
1984); 2 Glen on Mortgages § 140 (1943).

1180, 1187

(Idaho

Based upon the separate

and independent nature of each obligation, courts in Utah and
other states have uniformly held that when a junior lienholder1s
deed of trust becomes valueless, whether by an act of the debtor
or a foreclosure of the debtor's interest by a senior lienholder,
the junior lienholder may bring an action against the maker of
the note based solely upon the obligations created by the note.
For example, in Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453
B.P.O.E., 56 P.2d 1046 (Utah 1936), the Utah Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of determining whether the plaintiff, a
mortgagee in a junior position, could maintain an action on a
note

after

its

security

had

been

extinguished

foreclosure by a mortgagee in a senior position.

through

the

The Supreme

Court reasoned that "where the security has been lost through no
fault of the [junior] mortgagee, an action may be maintained
directly upon the personal obligation evidenced by the note."
Id. at 1049.

(Emphasis Added.)

As the Court noted, once the

security created by the second deed of trust is extinguished, it
would be fruitless for the junior lienholder to look to that deed
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of trust as a means of recovering on the obligation.

Id.

The

Court further observed:
It was no fault of the plaintiff
that the security for its note was
lost. The fault is rather with defendant
for failing to pay the first mortgage and
thus causing it to be foreclosed.
The
plaintiff could not have prevented the
loss of the security by foreclosing its
second mortgage. The mortgaged premises
were not sufficient to satisfy the first
mortgage.
. . . Plaintiff has no longer a lien
upon the propertyf and his debt is not
now secured by mortgage.
He did not
voluntarily release his security. He has
not
waived
nor
lost
it
by
his
negligence. It was lost by the fault of
the mortgagor in not paying the first
mortgage. . . . [T]he foreclosure of the
first mortgage does not extinguish the
liability of the maker of the second
mortgage
note and a
suit may be
maintained on such a note.
Id.

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Respondents Adams and Ferrin

are

in precisely

the same

position as the junior lienholder in Cache Valley Banking.

The

security evidenced by their deed of trust was lost, not through
3

Appellants suggest that the Cache Valley Banking case has
no application to this matter because of the passage of Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) subsequent to that decision.
However,
appellants fail to mention that the rationale of the Cache Valley
Banking case has recently been reiterated in two Utah Supreme
Court cases decided long after the passage of § 57-1-32 (1953).
See Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah
1983); Utah Mortgage and Loan v. Black, 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah
1980) .
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any fault of their own, but through the fault of the appellants
in not paying the senior lienholder.

Upon determining that the

proceeds from the foreclosure of the first lien by the F.D.I.C.
were insufficient to cover the obligation created by the Notef
(see R.

47; 140; 147) Adams and Ferrin brought

this action

directly upon the personal obligations evidenced by the Note in
conformance with the holding of Cache Valley Banking,
The position

of

the Utah

Supreme Court

in Cash Valley

Banking has been echoed by the courts of numerous other states.
See, e.g., Hartford National Bank and Trust Co. v. Bowers, 491
A.2d

431

(Conn. App.

promissory
securing

note after

Ct.

1985)

(plaintiff

the court determined

could

sue

on a

that the mortgage

the note was invalid); Gebrueder Heidemann, K.G. v.

A.R.M. Corp., 688 P.2d 1180, 1187 (Idaho 1984) ("If the mortgage
given

as

security

is

defective

or

becomes

valueless,

the

mortgagee, assuming it prevails on the merits, is still entitled
to a judgment on the promissory note which is independent of the
mortgage security."); C D . Blanton v. Sisk, 318 S.E.2d 560, 563
(N.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he status of a holder of a second
purchase money mortgage or deed of trust who does not realize the
security or any of the proceeds from the foreclosure sale, is
that of an unsecured creditor."); Keever v. Nicholas Beers Co.,
611 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Nev. 1980) ("The opportunity to sue directly
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on the obligation afforded to sold out juniors arises from the
loss

of

their

liens

on

the

security

by

operation

foreclosure or trustee's sale [by a senior lienholder].").

of

the

Olson

v. Iacometti, 533 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Nev. 1975) ("Foreclosure of
the first trust deed extinguishes only the security for [that]
note, not the indebtedness represented by that note."); Sims v.
Grubb 336 P.2d 759, 761 (Nev. 1959) (" [Foreclosure of the first
mortgage does not extinguish the liability of the maker of the
second mortgage note upon loss of the mortgage security through
the foreclosure of the first mortgage.").
In
assume

their

brief,

appellants,

that

respondents'

without

Complaint

discussion,

seeks

a

simply

deficiency.

Appellants have plainly failed to recognize the distinction so
clearly

set

forth

in

the

cases

between

an

action

for

a

deficiency4 and an action on a note after the security for the
note is rendered valueless.

That distinction is inherent in the

above-cited cases authorizing suits on notes by sold out junior
lienholders, and was discussed in detail in Hillen v. Soule, 45

4

An action for a deficiency judgment is an action for the
balance due on an obligation secured by a mortgage or deed of
trust following the exercise of the power of foreclosure in such
mortgage or deed of trust. See, e.g., Langer v. Aver, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 847, 849 (Cal. App. 1966); Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino,
378 P.2d 97, 99 (Calif. 1963). See also, Black's Law Dictionary
379-80 (5th Edition).
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P.2d 349 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935)f a case involving facts very
similar to this case.
The plaintiff in Hillen held a second deed of trust.

After

his security interest was lost through foreclosure by the holder
of the first deed of trust, the plaintiff brought an action based
solely upon his promissory note more than three months after the
foreclosure by the senior lienholder.
the plaintiff's

action was barred

The defendant claimed that
by

the California

statute

relating to deficiency actions, which was similar to Utah Code
Ann.

§ 57-1-32

deficiency

(1953),

in

that

it

required

actions

a

to be commenced within three months following the

exercise of the power of sale in a deed of trust.
the

for

inherent

distinction

between

a deficiency

Recognizing

action and an

action on an unsecured note, the Hillen court concluded that the
three-month limitation period relating to deficiency actions was
inapplicable to the plaintiff's action.

The Hillen court noted:

It is a sufficient answer to state that this
is not an action for a deficiency judgment.
The security was exhausted by the sale under
the first deed of trust and no sale was had
under respondent's deed of trust.
• . . [I]t may be pointed out that power of
sale under respondent's deed of trust was
never exercised because the security had been
exhausted by the sale under the first deed of
trust.
We therefore conclude that the
limitations referred to by appellant were not
applicabley . . .
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Id, at 349.

(emphasis added).

As in Hillen, the respondents' security was "exhausted by
the

sale

under

the

first

deed

of

trust".

In

addition,

respondents at no time commenced an action to foreclose their
deed of trust and have never exercised their power of sale.
Thus, appellants1 conclusory arguments notwithstanding,

(R 40).

respondents1 Complaint is simply not an action for a deficiency
judgment, but is rather an action by a creditor on an unsecured
obligation.
2.

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 57-1-32

(1953)

Relates

Only

To

Deficiency Actions And Therefore Has No Application To This Case.
(a)

Utah's Statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953)

states as follows:
At any time within three months after any
sale of property under a trust deed, as
hereinabove
provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon the
obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security, and in such action, the complaint
shall
set
forth
the entire amount of
indebtedness which was secured by such trust
deed, the amount for which such property was
sold, and the fair market value thereof at the
date of sale.
(Emphasis Added).
On its face, it is clear that the sole purpose of this
statute is to limit the time in which a beneficiary under a deed
of

trust

can

bring

an

action
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for

a

deficiency

after

the

foreclosure of his deed of trust fails to satisfy the obligations
created by his deed of trust.

The statute simply does not say,

as appellants suggest, that any and all junior lienholders whose
security

interest

is extinguished

through a foreclosure of a

prior deed of trust, must bring an action within three months of
the sale of the property.

Indeedf the language in the statute

discusses only one trust deed and only one obligation for which
the trust deed was given as security —

plainly referring to the

trust deed and obligation being foreclosed.

In addition, the

statute discusses only one recovery, that being the balance which
remains "due on the obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security."

(Emphasis added).

The statutory language thus

places no express limitation on when junior lienholders may sue
on notes once their security has been extinguished.

Further,

appellants have not cited a single case interpreting the statute,
or

similar

statutes, which

even

remotely

suggests

that

the

statute should apply to sold out junior lienholders.
(b) Moratory Laws in General.
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1953) is very similar to statutes
in

many

other

states, all

of

which

have

legislation commonly known as moratory laws.
rule,"

fair

value

legislation,

as

their

origin

The "one action

anti-deficiency

statutes

and

deficiency statutes of limitations are the product of the 1930's
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when depressed

land values resulted in foreclosure sales for

nominal amounts.

In discussing how the statutory protections

afforded by the moratory

laws affect junior lienholders, one

noted author in this area has written:
[S]uppose . . • the second mortgagee has no
security, as demonstrated by the results that
actually attended foreclosure of the first
lien.
Then, he is nothing but a general
creditor to the full extent of his debt. He
was always in the shoes of the mortgagor
anyway, as against the senior mortgage.
So
also are the latterfs general creditor's as is
demonstrated
by
the
law of creditors1
rights.
If, then, his security is actually
worthless, the second mortgagee's position is
no
different
from
that
of
a
general
Ltor
cred:
Since these deficiency judgment
laws do not operatte as a restriction upon
general debts, it follows that they do not
goveitrn the second mortgagee, who is nothing
but
a
general
creditor
unde r
the
circumstances.
2 Glenn on Mortgages § 161 (1943).

(Emphasis Added).

Consistent with this view, courts have generally held that
none

of

the

lienholders.

moratory

laws

apply

to

sold

out

junior

See, e.g., First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v.

Felger, 658 F.Supp. 175, 182 (D. Utah 1987) (the one action rule
does not apply to sold out junior lienholders); C D . Blankton v.
*
The one judicial exception to this rule, which has no
application to this case, arises when there is a state statute
which
completely
prohibits
deficiency
judgments
after a
non-judicial foreclosure of a purchase money deed of trust. See,
Barnaby v. Boardman, 330 S.E.2d 600, 602-03 (N.C. 1985).
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Sisk, 318 S.E.2d 560f 563 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("[Tjhe status of
a holder of a second purchase money mortgage or deed of trustf
who does not realize the security or any of the proceeds from the
foreclosure sale, is that of an unsecured creditor.

As a general

rule the anti-deficiency statute does not apply to actions by
unsecured creditors."); Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty Co.f 657
P.2d

1333f

1336

(Utah

1983)

(the

one-action

rule

has

no

application to sold-out junior lienholdersf citing Cash Valley
Bankingy
1083

supra); Keever v. Nicholas Beers Co., 611 P.2d 1079,

(Nev.

1980)("It

is

well

established

that,

while

the

statutory protections apply to sales under senior liens, neither
the one action rule nor the fair market valuation limitations
. . . apply to sold out junior lienholders, who are free to sue
directly on their notes."); McMillan v. United Mortgage Co., 437
P. 2d 878, 879 (Nev. 1968) ("We

. . . hold that the 'One Form

Action Rule1 does not apply to a sold-out junior lienholder where
his

security

has

been

lost

by

foreclosure

of

a

senior

lienholder."); Schwerin v. Shostak, 28 Cal. Rptr. 332, 336 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1963)("It has long been the law in California that
the fOne Form of Action1 rule. . . does not apply to a sold out
junior lienholder."); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 523 (1949)("Actions
for a deficiency

judgment must be brought within the period

prescribed by statute . . . .

[However,] such statute does not
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apply to cases in which the lien of the mortgage has been cut off
by the foreclosure of a prior mortgage, so that there cannot be a
foreclosure and sale of the mortgage in issue.")
(c) Moratory

Laws Which Limit

The Time

to File an

Action for a Deficiency.
The statute relied upon by the appellants is a moratory law
which

strictly

limits

the period

during

lienholder can file a deficiency action.

which a

foreclosing

Appellants correctly

argue that courts have universally acknowledged that actions for
a deficiency

judgment must be brought within the time period

prescribed by such statutes, even when that time period is very
short.

However, appellants have failed to disclose that the

courts have consistently held that such statutes do not apply to
actions brought upon an obligation which was once secured, but is
no longer secured due to a foreclosure of a prior lien.
For example, in Roseleaf Corp, v. Chierighino, 378 P. 2d 97
(Cal. 1963), the plaintiff

brought an action to recover

the

amounts unpaid on three notes which had been secured by second
trust deeds.

The second trust deeds were rendered valueless when

the property was sold under powers of sale contained in the first
trust deeds.

The defendant asserted that the plaintiff's action

was barred by California's three-month statute of limitation for
deficiency judgments.

Finding that the statute did not bar the
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plaintiff's actionf the court simply stated that the three-month
limitation

period

lienholder" whose
senior sale.

"does

not

security

Id. at 99.

apply

has been

to

a

sold-out

rendered

junior

valueless by a

(Citations Omitted.)

Similarly, In Hillen v. Soulef supra, the defendant asserted
that the plaintiff's action to recover funds due on a note after
the security for the note was extinguished by foreclosure by a
senior

lienholder

limitation.

was

barred

by

the

three-month

statute of

In interpreting the statute, the court stated that

since the power of sale under respondent's deed of trust was
never exercised and the security had been exhausted by the sale
under the first deed of trust, the plaintiff's action was "not an
action for a deficiency judgment" and the three-month limitation
period was not applicable.

Id. at 349.

Further, in Smith v. Mangin, 292 N.Y.S. 265 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1936), the plaintiff, a junior lienholder whose security had been
lost

as

a

result

of

lienholder,

brought

obligation.

In

plaintiff's

action

an

a

action

defense,
was

foreclosure

the

barred

to

conducted

collect

defendant
by

a

New

on

by
the

claimed
York

a

senior

remaining
that

statute

the
which

required that an action to collect a deficiency must be commenced
within three months from the date of the foreclosure sale.

In

determining that the statute did not bar the plaintiff's action,
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the court stated that the "short statute of limitations applies
only to those cases where there has been a foreclosure of the
mortgage which accompanies the [obligation].

The statute has no

application where the lien of the mortgage has been cut off by
the foreclosure of a prior mortgagee."

Id. at 271.

It is thus clear from the language in the Utah statute and
from decisions interpreting similar statutes and moratory laws in
general that Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) has no application
to sold-out junior lienholders, such as respondents, who have had
their security extinguished by a senior lienholder, who have not
exercised their power of sale and who are bringing an action
solely on a note.
3.

Practical Effect of Appellants1 Argument.

The essence of appellants1

argument is contained

following excerpt from their brief:
"[I]f any creditor conducts any sale under
Title 57, then the three-month rulef under
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 is automatically
invoked
against
all
creditors
holding
obligations secured by trust deeds on the
property.
Thus
all
creditors
holding
obligations secured by a trust deed are
governed by Utah Code Title 57 once any
creditor holding an obligation secured by a
deed of trust elects the power of sale under
said Title."
Appellants1 Brief at 23.
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in the

As

has

been

discussed

above,

completely contrary to the law.

appellants'

argument

is

Additionally, however, the

acceptance of appellants1 tortured reading of Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-32

(1953) would cause confusion and chaos in the

finance and real estate industries.
First, Utah Code Ann. §57-1-26(1) (1953) sets forth
the procedure by which any person can file a Request for
Notice to receive any

relevant Notice of Default and/or

Notice of Election to Sell.

If a junior lienholder does not

file a Request For Notice, no notice of a foreclosure sale
need be given.

See Utah Code Ann. §57-1-26(2)

(1953).

According to appellants1 analysis, a junior lienholder, who
has not filed a Request For Notice and who has not therefore
received notice of a foreclosure sale, will nonetheless be
time

barred

institute

from

an

seeking

action

a

within

deficiency
three

months

foreclosure sale by a senior lienholder —
even known about!

if

he

does not

following

a

a sale he did not

Appellants have not and cannot present

any authority that the legislature intended that Utah Code
Ann.

§ 57-1-32

(1953) should

operate

in such an unfair

manner to deprive junior lienholders of their rights.
Second, a junior lienholder could receive notice of
a

senior

lienholder's

foreclosure
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sale at

the time the

obligation to the junior lienholder is not in default or has
not matured.

According to the appellants1 analysis, that

junior lienholder would be required to bring an action to
collect on the note within three months of the foreclosure
sale, whether or not the junior lienholder* s note was in
default and whether or not the note had matured.

An action

brought on an obligation that is not in default and not yet
due and payable would likely be dismissed summarily, unless
the court concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953)
required the automatic acceleration of the due date of the
junior obligation.

The California Supreme Court discussed

this possibility in Roseleaf Corporation v. Chierighino, 378
P.2d 97 (Cal. 1963), where it stated, "to compel a junior
lienholder to sue for a deficiency within three months of a
seniorfs sale would unnecessarily compel acceleration of the
junior obligation to the detriment of of the debtor."
at 99.

Plainly, such a result would create an undue and

unexpected
concluded

Id.

hardship
that

the

on

debtors;

three-month

therefore,
period

could

the

court

have

no

application to sold-out junior lienholders.
4.

The Cases Cited by Appellants Have No Relation To

This Matter.
In support of their argument that respondents were
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required to assert their claims within three months of the
F.D.I.C.'s foreclosure salef appellants cite Green v. Coxf
696

P.2d

1207

(Utah 1985) and Concepts, Inc. v. First

Security Realty Services, 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987).

Both

of these cases, however, are completely irrelevant.

Cox

involved a suit filed by first lienholders to obtain a
deficiency judgment after they had exercised the power of
sale provision contained in their deed of trust.

The courtfs

no junior lienholders involved in the case.
opinion

There were

in Cox does not discuss, or even imply, that a

junior lienholder must file an action to recover on a note
within

three

months

of

the

foreclosure

of

a

senior

lienholder's interest.
Similarly, the Concepts, Inc. case has nothing to do
with

this

case.

In Concepts, Inc., the Supreme Court

stated, "the sole legal issue before the trial court was the
validity of the [foreclosure] sale.11

743 P.2d at 1159.

Again, the Concepts, Inc. case involved a suit filed by a
first lienholder to obtain a judgment for the difference
between the proceeds it received as a result of foreclosing
its deed of trust and the amounts remaining due on the
obligation that the deed of trust secured.
were

no

junior

lienholders

even mentioned
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Again, there
in the case.

Thus, appellants have cited absolutely no authority to this
court in support of their novel interpretation of Utah Code
Ann, § 57-1-32 (1953).
B.

The
District
Court
Properly
Granted
Respondents1 Motion For Summary Judgment In
That There Were No Genuine Issues Of Material
Fact And Respondents Were Entitled To Judgment
As A Matter Of Law.
1.

Appellants
Presented
No
Evidence
Supporting Their Conclusory Allegation
That They Were Accommodation Makers Of
The Promissory Note.

It is well established that a party claiming accommodation
status has the burden of proving that status.

See, e.g. , Utah

Farm Production Credit Association v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154, 158
(Utah

1987)

("A

maker

accommodation party

on a note proclaiming

that he is an

. . . entitled to the privileges accorded

[them] under the law has the burden of proving his accommodation
character.11)

This court has recently clarified that, whether a

person is an accommodation party is a question of the intentions
of the person claiming to be an accommodation party, the person
who would be the accommodated party, and the person who was the
holder
signed.

of

the

Id.

paper

when

the

alleged

accommodation

party

Thus, in order to create a material issue of fact

necessary to preclude the entry of summary judgment in this case,
appellants had the burden of providing evidence to the district
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that appellants, respondents, and the Cundicks all intended to
accord
note.

appellants

the status of accommodation

makers of the

See, e.g.y Id. at 158.

Other than their own self-serving and conclusory affidavits
that they signed the note "as guarantors" (R. 118 at 11 4; R. 121
at 11 4; R. 124 at 11 4 ) f appellants presented absolutely no facts
to the district court supporting their contention that they were
accommodation makers.

First, the note itself does not identify

the appellants as such

(R. 49; Addendum

"C").

Further, and

contrary to appellants' argument, the location of appellants'
signatures on the note, does not constitute evidence of their
status as guarantors.

Id. at 159

("The

fact that one party

signs above another or to the left of another, without some
serious indicia that the locus of the signature is to have any
significance,
status].")

is

irrelevant

[to

question

of

accommodation

Finally, appellants presented no evidence that either

the respondents or the Cundicks intended the appellants to enjoy
accommodation status under the note.
Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
note compel the conclusion that appellants were not accommodation
makers.

Significantly,

and

again

contrary

to

appellants'

argument, appellants received substantial benefits and value in
connection with their execution of the note, unlike the typical
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party

claiming

accommodation

status.

See

Id,

(reception of

benefits by party in connection with execution of note raises
"permissible

inference"

that

party

is

not

an

accommodation

maker).
It must be recalled that at the time appellants agreed to
execute the notef they were in default of their obligations owing
to respondents under the Uniform Real Estate Contract (R. 140 at
11 4).

Respondents forbore from bringing suit against appellants

under the Uniform Real Estate Contract and instead agreed to the
terms

of

Cundicks

the

Cundick

executed

forbearance

alone

sale, under

the subject

which

promissory

constituted

a

appellants
note.

substantial

and

the

Respondents'
benefit

to

appellants, effectively extending the time for repayment of their
debt.

See, e.g.f

Eastern

Idaho Production Credit Ass'n. v.

Placerton, Inc., 606 P.2d 967 (Idaho 1980); A&S Distributing Co.
v. Wall - Tucher, Inc., 428 P.2d 254 (Okla. 1967).

Further,

appellants received a direct cash benefits in connection with the
execution of the note because respondents1 agreed to apply the
down payment of the Cundicks to the amount owing by appellants
under

the

receipt
execution

Uniform

of
of

Real

substantial
the

note

Estate

Contract.

benefits
creates
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an

in

Thus, appellants1

connection

inference

that

with
they

their
were

principal obligors and not accommodation makers.

See, e.g., Utah

Farm Production Credit Assn. v. Watts, supra at 159.
More fundamental, it must be emphasized that the promissory
note executed by appellants was merely a reaffirmation or renewal
of their own debt to respondents owing under the Uniform Real
Estate

Contract.

That

debt

was

never

extinguished

and

respondents certainly never agreed to release appellants from the
debt.

Rather, respondents simply agreed to extend the time of

payment of the debt and to accept the Cundicks as co-obligors.
Thus, the debt being their own, appellants, as a matter of law,
cannot be accommodation makers of the note.

jCd. , ("[A] party

cannot be an accommodation maker on a note given for his or her
own debt." citing Kopf v. Miller, 501 S.W. Sd. 532, 537 (Mo. App.
1973)); see also Mooney v. G.R. & Associates, 746 P.2d 1174, 1177
(Utah App. 1987) .
In short, other than their own self-serving and conclusory
allegations that they signed the note as "guarantors", appellants
presented no evidence from which their accommodation party status
could be inferred.

To the contrary, appellants1

receipt of

benefits in connection with the note and their pre-existing debt
to respondents compel the conclusion that appellants were not
accommodation makers of the note.
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2.

Even if Appellants Were Accommodation
Makers of the Promissory Note, They
Waived the Impairment of Collateral
Defense*

Appellants contend that as alleged accommodation makers of
the notef they are entitled to the statutory protections afforded
such

parties

Specificallyf

under

the

appellants

Utah

argue

Uniform

thatf

based

Commercial
upon

Code.

respondents1

subordination of their trust deed, they should be allowed to
invoke the impairment of collateral defense set forth at Utah
Code Ann. §70A-3-606(1)(b)

(1953),

which states

in pertinent

part:
(1) The holder discharges any party to the
instrument to the extent that without such party's
consent the holder

(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for
the instrument given by or en behalf of the party
or any person against whom he has a right or
recourse.
(Emphasis added).
Plainly, under the express terms of the statute, lack of
consent to the impairment of collateral is a pre-condition to the
assertion of the impairment of collateral defense.
official

comments

to

§3-606

of

the Uniform

Indeed, the

Commercial

Code

expressly recognize that the defense is waived through consent
given at any time by the accommodation maker:
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2.
Consent may be given in advance and is
commonly incorporated in the instrument; or it may
be given afterward. It requires no consideration
and operates as a waiver of the consenting party's
right to claim his own discharge
U.C.C. §3-606 Comment 2 (1978).
Appellantsf

of

course, neglect

to point

out

that

consented to the subordination of respondents1 trust deed.
note

executed

by

them

expressly

states

that

they
The

"[t]he makers,

sureties, guarantors and endorsors hereof . . . consent to . . .
the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without
substitution."

(R. 49; Addendum

ft lf

C ).

Thus, having expressly

consented to the release of the security given in connection with
the note, appellants plainly waived the impairment of collateral
defense.

See, e.g. , Continental Bank, etc. v Utah Sec. Mortg.,

701 P.2d 1095, 1097-98 (Utah 1985) (guarantors explicitly waived
impairment of collateral defense by consenting to release of
security); American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo, 540 P.2d 1294,
1299 (N.M. 1975); Haney v. Deposit Guaranty National Bank, 362
S.2d 1250, 1252 (Miss. 1978).
3.

Appellants Presented No Evidence to the
District Court Supporting Their Arguments
(1) That They Did Not Know About or
Consent to Respondents1 Subordination of
Their Trust Deed, (2) That the Amount
Owing Under the Note was Disputed, or (3)
That
There Were Questions of Fact
Concerning the Intent of the Parties and
the Underlying Purpose of the Documents.
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(a) Knowledge of or Consent

to Subordination.

Assuming

appellants presented sufficient evidence to the district court
from

which

their

status

as

accommodation

parties

could

be

inferred, and assuming further that appellants did not waive the
impairment of collateral defense by expressly consenting to the
release of security, appellants nonetheless presented no evidence
to the district court that they did not know about or did not
consent

to

the

subordination

of

respondents1

trust

deed.

Contrary to the suggestions in Appellants' Brief,6 appellants1
affidavits are completely silent regarding whether or not they
had knowledge of or consented to the subordination.
126).

(See R. 118-

There is thus not a shred of evidence in the record even

suggesting that appellants were not fully aware of or did not
fully consent to the subordination.

Thus, for this additional

reason, appellants' impairment of collateral defense must fail.
(b) Amount Owing.
assertion

that

"the

In their Brief, appellants make the bold
amount

[appellants] owed under
disputed."

claimed

by

[respondents]

that

the trust deed note was specifically

Appellants' Brief at 43.

Appellants cite their own

affidavits as support for this statement, but those affidavits in

b

At page 43 of Appellants1 Brief, appellants state that
respondents subordinated their lien on the collateral without the
knowledge of the appellants, citing the affidavits of appellants
for evidentiary support.
-36-

no way take issue with the amount claimed by respondents.
R. 118-126).

(See

Indeed, there is absolutely no support in the

record for appellants1 argument that the amount owing under the
note was disputed and appellants simply misstate the record by
suggesting otherwise.
(c) Intent of the Parties and Purpose of the Documents.
Appellants attempt

to conjure up material

suggesting

that

vaguely

the

"intent of

issues of fact by

the parties11 or the

"purpose of the documents" was somehow unclear or in dispute.
Merely saying such things, however, does not create a material
issue of fact.
these mysterious
whether

they

Appellants do not even suggest the nature of
issues concerning

have

respondents.

any

bearing

on

Indeed, appellants1

"intent" or

"purpose," or

appellants'
arguments

liability

in

this

to

regard

appear to be nothing more than a smoke screen designed to divert
this Court's attention from the clear and unambiguous language of
the

promissory

note

and

appellants

clear

liability

to

respondents.
'Similarly, respondents do not even discuss the relevance of
other alleged "issues of fact" raised by them.
For example,
respondents suggest that there were "questions" concerning the
value of the property sold at the trustee's sale, but leave one
to guess what, if any, effect such "questions" have on their
liability under the note to appellants.
Q

°Appellantsf citation to the case of W.M. Barnes Co. v.
Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981) provides no
(Continued)
-37-

VII.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly denied appellants1 Motion to
Dismiss respondents1 Complaint.
action for a deficiency
§ 57-1-32

(1953).

Respondents1 Complaint is not an

judgment governed

by Utah Code Ann.

Further, even if respondents1

action were

properly characterized as an action for a deficiency, appellants
have not cited a single case or authority suggesting that the
three-month

limitation

period

set

forth

in

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 57-1-32 (1953) has any application to this case.

In factr

courts

have

have

consistently

held

that

such

statutes

no

application to sold out junior lienholders such as respondents.
Further, the district court properly granted respondents'
Motion

for

Summary

Judgment.

The

affidavits

submitted

by

respondents were undisputed concerning appellants1 liability and
the amount owing under the note.

Appellants simply presented no

evidentiary basis supportive of their argument that they signed
the

note

as

accommodation

makers.

Even

if

they

were

accommodation makers, they clearly and unambiguously consented to
assistance in terms of illuminating the nature of appellants'
argument. That case dealt with the issue of whether a deed was
intended as a conveyance or a mortgage.
This Court concluded
that because the intentions of the parties on that issue were
unclear, that summary judgment was inappropriate. Clearly, the
Barnes case has no bearing whatsoever on this matter.
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the release of security under the note and therefore waived the
impairment of collateral defense.
remarks

throughout

their

brief

Finally, appellants shotgun
suggesting

the

existence

of

material issues of fact are simply unsupported by the record or
are wholly irrelevant to appellants' liability to respondents.
Thus, the district court's Order and Judgment should be affirmed
and

respondents

should

be

awarded

their

attorneys1

associated with this appeal.
DATED:

September

c \

, 1988.
HANSEN & ANDERSON

William P./SchWartz

Shawn C. Ferrii
50 West Broadw&y, 6th Floor
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondents
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fees

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

2?Q

day of Septemberf

1988/ I caused to be mailed in the United States mail/ postage
prepaid/

four

true

and

correct

copies

of

Respondents1 Brief/ to:
Douglas M. Durbano
4185 Harrison Boulevard/ #320
Ogdenr Utah 84403
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the

foregoing

C:C l]

2 3*; PH 'P7

V'prWilliam P. Schwart, Bar No. 4404
Shawn C. Ferrin, Bar No. 4832
HANSEN & ANDERSON
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

G. ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
a Utah limited partnership,
and C.A. FERRIN, JR.,
Pla itiffs,

ORDER

v.
DAVID DURBANO, PAUL SACHTER,
RICHARD MORTENSEN, STEVEN F.
CUNDICK, and MARLENE H.
CUNDICK,

Civil No, J053-87

Defendants.
The Motion to Dismiss of defendants David Durbano, Paul Sachter and
Richard Mortensen came on for hearing on December 14, 1987. The Court, having
considered the memoranda submitted by the parties and the arguments of counsel,
HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied;

2.

Defendants Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen shall have ten days

from December 14, 1987 in which to respond to plaintiffs' Complaint and
plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment;

EXHIBIT

A

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment will be determined by the

Court pursuant to Rule 2,8 of the Local Rules of Practice for the Second Judicial
District Court upon the conclusion of all briefing relating to the motion;
4.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions filed in response to defendants'

Motion to Dismiss is denied.
DATED: December ZD , 1987.
BY THE COURT:

)avid E. Roth
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DATED: December

JgH987.

HANSEN & ANDERSON

ram e. bcnwartz
50 West Broadway, 6t
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DATEDs December

, 1987.

DURBANO k SMITH

Douglas M. Durbano
4185 Harrison Boulevard, #320
Ogden, Utah 84404
Attorneys for Durbano, Sachter & Mortensen
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

G. ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
a Utah limited partnership,
and C.A. FERRIN, JR.,
ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs
v.

Civil No.

DAVID DURBANO, PAUL SACHTER,
RICHARD MORTENSEN, STEVEN F.
CUNDICK, and MARLENE H.
CUNDICK,

(IQ53-87

Defendants.

Plaintiffs1, G. Adams Limited Partnership and C. A. Ferrin, Jr. ("Adams and
Ferrin11) Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on
January 29, 1988, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde
in his courtroom at the Weber County Courthouse, Ogden, Utah.

Adams and

Ferrin were represented by William P. Schwartz, Esq. of Hansen & Anderson and
Defendants David Durbano, Paul Sachter and Richard Mortensen were represented
by Durbano, Smith <5e Reeve. Defendants Steven F. Cundick and Marlene Cundick
did not contest Plaintiffs' Motion.

Upon consideration of the Memoranda,

Affidavits, Pleadings on File and the Arguments of Counsel, the Court finds that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Adams and Ferrin are entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that judgment be and hereby is granted in
favor of Plaintiffs and against all D Pendants, jointly and severally, as follows:

EXHIBIT

B

r

> f\

Recorded BookJ-/J.r.
Page
Lu.v.v..
Indexed
A.

For the principal sum of $38,604.59 together with prejudgment

interest of $15,774.93 from May 4, 1984 through January 29, 1988, in the total
amount of $54,379.52, plus interest thereon at the rate of eleven percent (11%)
per annum ($16.42 per diem) from the date of entry of judgment until paid.
B.

For costs and reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred in obtaining the

Judgment as established by affidavit in the amount of $ g>. /? Cf 3 ,

u

, plus

interest thereon at the rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum ($
per diem) from the date of entry of judgment until paid.
C.

For costs and reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred in collecting

the Judgment.
JUDGMENT RENDERED this

/ $

day of ^dfttwiy, 1988.

BY THE COURT

ATTEST MY HAND AND SEAL OF SAID COURT this / Q day of January,
1988.

CLERK OF THE COURT

(

By ' ^
\J*&&?i*.
UeputyClerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
G ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
a Utah limited partnership,
and C. A. FERRIN, JR.,
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS

Plaintiffs,
vs.

')

DAVID DURBANO, PAUL SACHTER,
RICHARD MORTENSEN, STEVEN F.
CUNDICK, and MARLENE CUNDICK,
Case No.

1053-87

Defendants.

This matter was heard on a motion for summary judgment.
Counsel

for

the defendants

stated

that

he would

be

able to

substantiate his defense if he was allowed some time to obtain
the paper work from Commercial Security Bank.
time was granted over plaintiffs1 objection.

This additional

When the additional

time allocation had run out, defendants1 counsel contacted this
judge by telephone stating he needed additional time because of
the switchover from Commerical Security Bank to Key Bank, they
were having difficulty locating the documents in question.

This

additional

than

time was

informally

supply

the

submit

an affidavit, which

opinion

and

Court with

conclusions

granted.

the purported

in

sets

rather

documentation, defendants

up

regard

Later,

a new
to

the

argument

based

transaction.

on
The

documentation that defendants1 counsel stated he would submit to
the Court has never been submitted; and no authority was granted
for the submission of additional affidavits and/or argument.

EXHIBIT

D

341

Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion
to Strike Affidavits
Case No. 1053-87

Plaintiffs' motion to strike the affidavit

is granted,

The summary judgment previously granted stands*
DATED this

&

day of May, 1988.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
true and correct copy of the foregoing

[Q

day of May, 1988, a

Memorandum

Decision was

served upon the following:
William P. Schwartz
Shawn C. Ferrin
HANSEN & ANDERSON
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Douglas M. Durbano
John H. Geilraann
DURBANO, SMITH & REEVE
Attorney for Defendants
4185 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403

Secretary

r>
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